A second Bill of Rights for New Zealand? by Rishworth, Paul
Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 2 – May 2010 – Page 3
A Second  
Bill of Rights 
for New Zealand?
Paul Rishworth
Introduction
The Regulatory Responsibility Bill (RRB) would set out 
what it calls ‘principles of responsible regulation’ (clause 
7). Regulation means all legislation, including secondary 
regulation and tertiary regulation such as codes and rules.
Paul Rishworth is Professor of Law at the 
University of Auckland, and has been the Dean 
of the Faculty of Law since 2005. His research 
interests include human rights and comparative 
constitutional law, and South Pacific legal 
studies, and he has published widely in these 
fields.
The RRB takes the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 as a model for its 
design. The idea is that the principles 
set a standard against which legislation 
is measured, both before it is introduced 
into parliament and after it has been 
enacted. When the legislation is secondary 
or tertiary legislation, the assessment for 
compatibility with the principles is to be 
made before the legislation is made.
The RRB hinges, then, around the 
concept of ‘compatibility’ with the 
principles. What are these ‘principles’?
They are set out in proposed section 7. 
They are essentially in two categories, 
what I will call substantive principles 
(what the legislation ought to be like in its 
substance) and procedural principles 
(how legislation ought to be made). 
Legislation should:
• be consistent with the rule of law: that is 
immediately specified in greater detail 
to mean (1) law should be clear, (2) it 
should not be adversely retrospective 
in the way it affects existing rights, (3) 
people should be equal before the law 
in the sense that it applies uniformly 
to all, and (4) issues of legal right and 
liability should be resolved by law and 
not administrative discretion;
• not diminish a person’s liberty, 
personal security, freedom of choice or 
action, or rights to own, use or dispose 
of property; 
• not take or impair property without 
consent of owner, save when the taking 
or impairing is in the public interest, and 
full compensation is provided by the 
persons who benefit from the taking.
Though expressed as a principle 
about what legislation should not do, the 
outcome is functionally equivalent to a 
right that people should not have such 
things done to them through legislation. 
Indeed, one of the ways in which rights 
are created in law is by creating duties on 
another not to infringe them. I will come 
back to that.
Then there are other substantive 
principles. Legislation should:
• not impose a tax unless it is in an act 
(a repetition of basic constitutional 
principle found elsewhere in our law);
• not impose charges for goods or 
services unless the charge is reasonable 
(essentially the inverse of that same 
constitutional principle);
• preserve the courts’ role in determining 
the meaning of legislation;
• provide a right of appeal on the merits 
whenever legislation authorises an 
official or a minister to take away a 
person’s rights or affect one of their 
freedoms or liberties. 
These, too, are essentially rights (that 
legislation should have this substance). 
That said, they are not rights of the 
classic sort that get included in bills of 
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rights (though the last could be, albeit 
that it is quite expansive and potentially 
problematic in practice). But they could 
be invoked by individuals in the context 
of specific cases.
Then follows a list of procedural 
principles. These are that legislation 
should not be made unless persons to be 
affected have been consulted to the extent 
practicable, and unless there has been a 
careful evaluation of the issue concerned, 
and of the effectiveness of any relevant 
existing legislation and common law, etc.
These, then, are the principles against 
which legislation is to be measured for its 
compatibility. When does the compatibility 
assessment take place? When a bill is 
introduced into the house, the responsible 
minister and the chief executive of the 
relevant department are to certify as to 
one of three possible things:
• that the proposed legislation is 
compatible with the stated principles;
• that a provision is incompatible, but 
the incompatibility is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society (a possibility set 
out in clause 7(2));
• that it is incompatible and the incom-
patibility is not justified, and that there 
are reasons for proceeding with it 
despite the unjustified incompatibility 
(surely a very rare possibility).
Obviously there is a fourth possibility 
that need not be spelled out: legislation 
may be incompatible and unjustified, 
with no reason for proceeding with it. 
In that event one assumes a bill won’t be 
introduced at all and parliament need not 
be troubled.
A certificate must be given also before 
the third reading of the bill in parliament. 
This is designed to ensure that proper 
attention is given to any amendments 
that have been made to a parliamentary 
bill as it makes its way through the 
select committee process, or by way of 
supplementary order paper.
After legislation is enacted, there 
are further occasions on which it may 
be measured against the principles for 
compatibility. Courts are empowered 
–indeed required – to give an enactment 
a meaning that is compatible with the 
principles in preference to any other 
meaning (clause 11(1)). It follows that 
any court faced with the argument 
that meaning A should be preferred 
over meaning B, because meaning B is 
incompatible with the principles, will have 
to actually inquire into whether meaning B 
truly is incompatible. And this will involve 
it deciding whether the incompatibility is 
reasonable and demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society. This is 
judicial review.
The bill recognises that this is all in the 
cause of interpretation of legislation; not 
a licence to re-write statutes. So it follows 
that a court may have made the inquiry 
and satisfied itself that meaning B is 
indeed incompatible with the principles to 
an extent that is not justified, yet conclude 
that meaning B is in fact the meaning to 
be given because no other meaning is 
plausibly available. Any court that does 
that, going through those reasoning steps, 
has in fact declared meaning B to be 
incompatible with the principles, while 
(of necessity) applying meaning B.
So to this point the RRB follows exactly 
the methodology of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, which similarly requires 
judges to measure legislation against the 
rights and freedoms in that bill. The Bill 
of Rights uses the language of consistency 
rather than compatibility, but it is the 
same thing. In a Bill of Rights case, a court 
is required to prefer statutory meanings 
that are consistent with the Bill of Rights 
over those that are not. And, of course, in 
order to do this, it has to decide whether 
a meaning (the one it is being urged to 
avoid) is in fact inconsistent. If it decides 
that it is inconsistent but that it cannot 
legitimately avoid that meaning because no 
plausible alternative meaning is available, 
the outcome is in fact a declaration of the 
inconsistency of that legislative provision 
with the Bill of Rights. This happens not 
infrequently, most recently in R v Hansen 
(2007). (Incidentally, in the Bill of Rights 
context, courts have been rather coy about 
this process and whether they are truly 
making ‘declarations of inconsistency’. But 
in my view and that of most commentators 
they plainly are, because it is implicit in 
the operation of the Bill of Rights that it 
requires legislation to be assessed against 
the standard of respect for rights.)
The RRB goes further than the Bill 
of Rights and makes it quite explicit that 
the courts are to make declarations of 
incompatibility in relation to a legislative 
provision, if that is their conclusion. They 
can do this only after the department 
responsible for the legislation has had 
the chance to provide its view on the 
legislation’s compatibility, and only 
after the solicitor-general has been given 
notice. No further consequence attaches 
to a judicial declaration that legislation is 
incompatible with the principles and that 
the incompatibilities cannot be justified 
in a free and democratic society. That is 
the same as under the Bill of Rights. It is 
moral suasion, the courts being able to be 
enlisted by litigants to express a view about 
the consistency of legislation. This is the 
model under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK) as well, where legislative adherence 
to the judicial declaration is the norm.
It can immediately be seen that there 
is a very close connection between the 
RRB and the existing New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act. Each sets standards for 
legislation. The standard comprises a set 
of principles, in one case, or rights, in 
the other, and also recognises that these 
are not absolute. They can be reasonably 
limited. But they can also be unreasonably 
limited. And the line between what is 
acceptable and unacceptable is marked by 
the concept of reasonable limits that may 
be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
... the line between what is acceptable and 
unacceptable is marked by the concept of reasonable 
limits that may be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
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Why the Regulatory Responsibility Bill is a 
bill of rights 
I want to start with what a bill of rights is, 
and then explain why this RRB is rather 
like having a second one.
The idea of a bill of rights is to set 
standards: a baseline below which law and 
executive action should not fall. The classic 
bill of rights is imposed upon a legislature 
by a higher law: as is the US one (ratified 
and adopted by constitutional conventions 
of ‘the People’), and the Canadian one, 
imposed by the UK parliament upon 
Canada. Once imposed, they set the terms 
on which all law is allowed to operate. 
They are, in a sense, a message from the 
people to the organs of their government. 
Or in the case of Canada, from a superior 
legislature to an inferior one.
More recently, beginning in Canada 
with the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, 
there has emerged the subtly-different 
phenomenon of legislative bills of rights 
that are essentially messages from the 
legislature to the courts. These bills of 
rights, passed as ordinary statutes, say 
‘here are the rights and freedoms that 
we in parliament think are fundamental 
in our society, and we affirm them in the 
law’. Then, because just affirming them 
does not necessarily accomplish anything 
in itself, these statutory bills of rights give 
instructions as to what happens when 
confronted with legislation that does 
not meet the standard. In the case of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
and some of its recent counterparts in 
other countries,1 interpreters are told to 
interpret legislation consistently with the 
affirmed rights (recognising of course 
that legislation will be consistent with 
them if it limits rights only to the extent 
that is reasonable in a free and democratic 
society).
What goes with the territory, with this 
sort of bill of rights, whether it is laid out 
explicitly or not, is that a court can declare 
that a provision in legislation is actually 
inconsistent with a right or freedom in a 
bill of rights. This is inevitable because 
the inquiry into whether a meaning ought 
to be avoided for bill-of-rights reasons is 
necessarily an inquiry into whether it is 
inconsistent with the bill of rights.
The RRB commentary claims that 
by setting out principles of responsible 
regulation, the bill is not creating free-
standing rights for individuals. The claim 
is that the RRB is simply saying ‘here is 
what legislation should be like: it should 
not diminish a person’s liberty or personal 
security or take or impair their property 
[etc]’. The argument is that this is different 
from saying that ‘everyone has a right to 
liberty, security and property’. But it isn’t 
different.
Let’s consider the most famous bill of 
rights, the US one. The First Amendment 
is explicitly a set of prohibitions on 
Congress. It says: 
Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech; 
or of the press, or the right of people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of 
grievances.
The rights of persons in the United 
States to freedom of religion and speech 
flow from that provision. To say that 
Congress has no power to make certain 
laws is to say that persons have a right to 
be free from such laws. Or, to put it in the 
language of W.S. Hohfeld’s jural relations, 
when Congress has ‘no power’ to infringe 
a right, persons have an immunity from 
their rights being infringed by Congress. 
That is what a bill of rights is.
In fact, as it happens in the United States 
the First Amendment is not construed just 
as a limitation on the power of Congress. 
It is routinely applied against executive 
action – against municipalities and school 
boards and public sector employers. The 
principle is that the executive and other 
state actors cannot be taken as empowered 
to do things that Congress could not itself 
enact and command by law. So in that 
way, too, the First Amendment truly does 
equate to a right of free exercise of religion 
and free speech.
So when the taskforce commentary 
says that the principles are guidelines for 
good legislation rather than individual 
rights that have as their bases respect 
for human dignity and freedom, I don’t 
agree. To say that there is a principle 
that legislation should not diminish a 
person’s liberty is functionally equivalent 
to saying that there is a principle that a 
person’s liberty should not be diminished 
by legislation. And it would, obviously, be 
the person whose liberty (or property) is 
diminished (or impaired) who seeks to 
bring the arguments to a court.
Though the RRB calls them ‘principles’, 
they are a standard for legislation (against 
which legislation can be declared 
incompatible, or alternative meanings 
chosen on the basis of the standard not 
being met). But it hardly matters what 
they are called. And nothing can be 
made of the fact that the RRB would say 
‘legislation should not’ whereas in the 
US the First Amendment says Congress 
‘shall make’ no law. In the RRB context 
(of declarations of incompatibility being 
possible), should not means must not.
Indeed, the very idea of the guideline 
about liberty and security of the person 
owes everything to the importance of 
those concepts as rights. That is why they 
are there. That is why the principle is 
important.
The only difference between the US 
formulation and the RRB formulation is 
that in the US a law that does abridge free 
speech (say) to the point of being ruled 
inconsistent with the Constitution is not 
applied. (People often say it is ‘struck 
down’, but that is a figure of speech. 
The real point is that laws inconsistent 
with the Constitution are not applied.) 
In New Zealand, in contrast, a law that 
In New Zealand ... a law that diminishes liberty, 
or that takes or impairs property, would be 
incompatible with the principle but would not for 
that reason be ‘dis-applied’.
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diminishes liberty, or that takes or 
impairs property, would be incompatible 
with the principle but would not for that 
reason be ‘dis-applied’. Still, a court could 
declare that it does diminish liberty or 
wrongly takes property and so amounts to 
incompatibility with the principles. That 
is, it could do under the RRB for liberty 
and security, etc precisely what it can do 
under the Bill of Rights for the rights in 
that document. That is why, in its key 
provisions – in its truly novel provisions 
– the RRB is functionally equivalent to a 
bill of rights.2
What flows from this?
Having two bills of rights is not a good idea
I think it a needless confusion and 
dangerous to have foundational civil and 
political rights spread around two statutes 
that operate in different ways. Here is 
why. First, I think it a bad idea to begin 
to proliferate statutes purporting to lay 
down a vision of the nation’s fundamental 
values, against which legislation is to be 
compared. If rights in the RRB are of the 
sort that should be in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, then that is where they 
should be.
Second, the RRB’s right of ‘liberty’ is 
the general concept of which the rights in 
sections 12 to 18 of the Bill of Rights are 
specific iterations. So the RRB effectively 
overlaps with the Bill of Rights Act, and 
this will be confusing for reasons I come 
to shortly. 
Proliferating statutes dealing with law-
making values
Recall that a statutory bill of rights is 
effectively one parliament saying ‘here 
is what we think is really important. 
Courts from now are on are to resolve 
interpretation issues by preferring our set 
of values. If they can’t resolve them within 
the rubric of interpretation, but consider 
the legislation of another parliament (a 
later or an earlier one) to be inconsistent 
with what we said, then declare that 
inconsistency.’
Law students learn early on that the law 
set its face against one parliament trying to 
control the sphere of law-making power of 
later parliaments. It goes without saying, 
for example, that if our 2010 parliament 
were to enact a law today that said that all 
its own laws were to set a standard against 
which future laws are to be measured, then 
this would be illegitimate. That seems 
intuitively wrong, as being contrary to the 
idea of democracy.
A bill of rights is not exactly like 
that but it is close. It is saying to future 
parliaments, and in respect of past ones: 
prefer interpretive solutions that give 
effect to our values and standards. This is 
generally regarded as acceptable because 
the values and standards are heavily 
abstracted and have a transcendent appeal; 
they are relatively timeless and attract a 
great deal of support in the community.
Statutes that do this need to have a sort 
of sanctity. Statutes about human rights 
tend to have this. Ours is drawn from 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which itself reflects the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
proclaimed in force after a consultation 
involving most countries of the world. 
Another example of a statute with 
sanctity, drawn from another context, is 
the English statute by which the United 
Kingdom joined the European Economic 
Community in 1972. In that statute it 
was said that henceforth, in cases where 
UK law was inconsistent with European 
Union law operating in the UK, then the 
European law was to prevail. In a famous 
1990 case called Factortame, and in another 
famous 2003 case called Thoburn, the 
English courts held that the 1972 statute 
actually set the rules: EU law overrode 
English law. That statute really did mean 
that even if a later parliament enacted a 
law inconsistent with EU law, then courts 
were bound to give effect to EU law. The 
1972 statute (requiring this result) had a 
sort of sanctity because of the political 
commitment to Europe which the people 
had come to accept.
So, even ordinary statutes setting 
standards on fundamental matters like 
rights, or giving effect to international 
treaties such as the Treaty of Rome, can have 
quasi-constitutional effect – controlling or 
at least influencing the substance of earlier 
and later law. Such statutes are sometimes 
called superstatutes. They are unlikely to 
be repealed. Even though it is technically 
possible to override them, for example 
by a later parliament passing a law saying 
that the law must prevail despite the 
superstatute, this is not often done.3
Now, I think it unwise to attempt 
too many of these statutes. I fear that if 
the RRB is enacted as it is, then it would 
invite further articulations of standards 
by subsequent parliaments.
There are indeed deep principles in 
our constitutional system that we have 
not thought it right, so far, to articulate 
in law. They are like reasons for action 
(as opposed to limits on action, which 
is what bills of rights tend to be). Cass 
Sunstein has called them constitutive 
commitments (Sunstein, 2004). Consider 
this list drawn from President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s wartime speech to Congress in 
which he proposed a ‘second bill of rights’, 
to include:
 the right to a useful and remunerative 
job in the industries or shops or farms 
or mines of the nation;
 the right to earn enough to provide 
adequate food and clothing and 
recreation;
 the right of every farmer to raise and 
sell his products at a return which will 
give him and his family a decent living 
… 4 (from Sustein, p.243)
Now, Roosevelt did not propose these 
for inclusion in the Constitution as such, 
While civil and political rights are often reasons for 
restricting what governments can do (whether by 
legislation or otherwise), it is the social and economic 
imperatives that prompt the doing of something, 
rather than nothing.
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but he did see these rights as an imperative 
for political action, which would of course 
include appropriate legislation. The 
truth is that all governments do likewise: 
politicians and parliaments of various 
persuasions do their honest best to 
formulate laws and policies that promote 
economic prosperity and well-being. 
Obviously, politicians differ amongst 
themselves as to the best ways of achieving 
these aims; they may place different 
emphases, for example, on sustainability 
and foreign policy, or individual initiative 
and collective responsibility. But these sorts 
of basic commitments are foundational to 
New Zealand society, as they are elsewhere. 
While civil and political rights are often 
reasons for restricting what governments 
can do (whether by legislation or 
otherwise), it is the social and economic 
imperatives that prompt the doing of 
something, rather than nothing.
I do not think that social and economic 
rights are matters for affirmation in 
statutes as standards for all law – certainly 
not if they are to be judicially enforced. 
But some might. Some might want an 
enactment that contains a set of welfare 
principles with which our law should be 
compared for consistency. Their set would 
be a very different one from the RRB’s. 
Such people might point to the fact that the 
RRB expresses its principles in a way that 
tends to demote environmental or welfare 
concerns by conceiving them as being 
incompatible with liberty, when it might 
be said that they are intrinsically part of 
it. Here I am referring to the particular 
construction of proposed section 7(1)
(b), which suggests that the only reason 
for restricting liberty is to protect the 
liberty of others. Restrictions based on 
sustainability or other imperatives must 
be conceived as incompatible with liberty 
(though they may then be rescued under 
proposed section 7(2) as ‘reasonable limits’ 
on liberty!). That formulation does seem 
to demote communitarian concerns.
I do not favour the multiplication 
of statutes that purport to lay down 
standards for law and public conduct. I 
think that where rights are appropriate 
for it, they should be in the Bill of Rights. 
That is the place where civil and political 
rights belong. The RRB if enacted might 
be countered by further articulations of 
principles for responsible law making, and 
we would not be advanced by multiple 
principles of this type.
Liberty and overlap with the Bill of Rights
A second reason why the RRB would be 
confusing if enacted is this. ‘Liberty’ in 
clause 7(1) denotes all the fundamental 
freedoms in sections 13 to 18 of the Bill of 
Rights: freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion, association and assembly. Hence 
the word liberty is the window through 
which (much of) the Bill of Rights is 
incorporated into the RRB, rather like the 
due process clause of the 14th Amendment 
of the US Constitution through which 
(much of) the US Bill of Rights is made 
applicable to the states. The US Bill of 
Rights was initially aimed at imposing 
limits on Congress and the federal 
government, and not the states, and it 
was only with the Civil War amendments 
in 1865 that civil rights obligations were 
constitutionally imposed upon the states. 
The 14th Amendment says: ‘no State shall 
deprive a person of life, liberty or property 
save by due process of law’.
The United States Supreme Court has 
said that the concept of liberty includes 
‘fundamental rights’, of which those set 
out in the First Amendment are examples, 
and in this way the First Amendment has 
been applied to the states. Something 
similar would happen with the RRB. 
Assessing a bill for its consistency with 
liberty would involve assessing it for 
its impact on freedom of expression, 
religion, association and assembly, and 
so replicate these rights in the Bill of 
Rights. But because the RRB has more 
protections built in than the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (to which I come 
below), the rights would be protected 
more stringently.
I am not complaining about that, but 
it is complex and also a little incoherent. 
The simple fact is that the Bill of Rights 
ought to contain the full catalogue of 
fundamental rights that we want to 
protect. It would make no sense to have 
two statutes dealing with the same set of 
rights in slightly different ways.
We have already faced a period of 
needless confusion from 1993 to 2001 when 
the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Bill 
of Rights each purported to cover public 
sector discrimination but in different 
language, and happily that was resolved 
by the 2001 amendment which made our 
Bill of Rights the sole standard. I believe 
there would be needless confusion if the 
RRB were enacted, particularly in relation 
to the certification requirement against 
the standards of liberty and security.
Recommendation 1: Put the appropriate 
rights into the Bill of Rights 
I come, then, to my recommendations. 
Firstly, I would be in favour of amending 
the Bill of Rights to include some of the 
rights in the RRB.
First, ‘security of the person’. The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 mentions 
‘security of the person’ but only elliptically. 
It is in the marginal note to sections 8 
through 11, which deal with the rights to 
life and against medical experimentation 
and torture. These are all iterations of the 
general right to security of the person. But 
they do not quite capture its full scope. It 
make sense to add ‘security’ of the person 
to the Bill of Rights.
Next, property. It would be appropriate 
to consider amending the Bill of Rights to 
include a right to property. This is found 
in most modern bills of rights, including 
the South African one and the Victorian 
one. 
The simple fact is that the Bill of Rights ought to 
contain the full catalogue of fundamental rights that 
we want to protect. It would make no sense to have 
two statutes dealing with the same set of rights in 
slightly different ways.
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I hasten to add that amending the 
Bill of Rights is a serious business and 
would have to be done after much study 
and consultation and in a bi-partisan 
way. We would need to be clear about the 
implications. But I think that a right to 
property should now be explored.
So in this respect I am inclined to go 
further than the taskforce. The Bill of 
Rights is the place for these rights. They 
do not belong in a list of principles for 
good legislation; not, at least, when there 
is a New Zealand Bill of Rights on the 
landscape.
I would be prepared to consider also 
a right to ‘liberty’ in the Bill of Rights. 
It is in the Canadian Charter and also 
the Victorian one. At its core it denotes 
physical liberty, and the well-charted risk 
is that it may be judicially interpreted to 
allow for substantive review (that if liberty 
is to be taken from a person, then there 
should not simply be fair procedure, but 
substantively fair laws that do not invade 
deep personal rights). 
And then there is the spectre of the 
Lochner era, when the US Supreme Court 
held that liberty included ‘freedom of 
contract’ and invalidated (that is, refrained 
from applying) some labour and welfare 
laws. That spectre might be reason enough 
for rejecting the RRB, but nonetheless 
I think it has to be said that for the last 
70 years the concept of ‘liberty’ has been 
cautiously applied in the US, and since 
1982 in Canada also. And if it were in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights it would reach 
some aspects of rights that are not dealt 
with in the Bill of Rights, particularly the 
ability to make intimate decisions about 
one’s life and one’s children. Recognising 
the statutory nature of our Bill of Rights, 
a right to liberty is worth seriously 
exploring, but for the Bill of Rights and 
not an RRB.
Recommendation 2
The RRB includes ‘operational provisions’ 
that are an improvement on the Bill 
of Rights, and these could usefully be 
incorporated into the Bill of Rights. These 
are:
• The need for certification of consistency 
as well as inconsistency. It would be 
useful if the Bill of Rights required 
the tabling of advice about every bill 
in parliament, including those where 
the advice is that the bill is consistent. 
While such advice is available on the 
Ministry of Justice website, it would 
be good for it to be publicly available 
within the parliamentary process.
• The third-reading certification of 
consistency. At present there is no Bill of 
Rights requirement for inconsistency 
reports after introduction of a bill, 
and so the effects of select committee 
amendments and supplementary 
order papers can go unexamined, in a 
formal sense.
• Explicit judicial declaration power. It 
would be beneficial to make explicit the 
courts’ power to declare enactments 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
They have asserted such a power since 
the Moonen case in 1999, and acted on 
the basis that such a power exists since 
at least 1998 in Quilter. Courts in the 
United Kingdom and in the Australian 
states with statutory bills of rights have 
such power. 
Recommendation 3
Beyond it being a catalogue of possible 
improvements to the Bill of Rights, I do 
not see advantages in the RRB as proposed, 
and many disadvantages. Essentially my 
reasons are as follows.
It would be a wasteful and needless 
distraction from the business of 
government if the government were to be 
required to defend its legislation in court 
against challenges that it had legislated 
inconsistently with these principles.
Some of the principles themselves 
are restatements of what is required (or 
prohibited) anyway – the taxation ones – 
and I do not find persuasive the idea that 
the RRB would in this respect be a useful 
reminder or discipline.
The strictly process principles (about 
the need to consider alternatives to 
legislation, etc) are not apt at all for 
interpretation principles (and are rightly 
excluded from the scope of declarations 
of incompatibility). So why have them 
at all? Isn’t the alternative to build a 
culture that asks such questions? And 
if there isn’t such a culture, it is certain 
that the RRB won’t have any effect at all 
because it is essentially a set of boxes to 
tick. The promoters recognise that, and 
that explains the concern to get judicial 
opinions on compatibility, but that comes 
at the cost of bringing judges into matters 
of politics and economics for which they 
are not trained (and of the diversion of 
state resources into litigation, as already 
mentioned).
Conclusion
I think we need to continue to build a 
political culture in which the answers are 
sought to the sorts of problems that the 
taskforce accepted to exist with legislation. 
But I do not think that bringing the 
judiciary in, as some sort of outside ‘check’, 
is either useful or productive, and I think 
that it is likely to be counter-productive. 
With that excised, the RRB could be 
parliament’s message to itself, and to the 
executive, as to how it should behave (and 
how secondary and tertiary legislation 
should be made). But with the principles 
largely replicated in the Cabinet Office 
Manual and constitutional principle, one 
wonders if the RRB is necessary once the 
provision about judicial involvement is 
excised.
1  In fact, the Canadian Bill of Rights was the most radical 
‘statutory bill of rights’, being held to authorise the non-
application of even later inconsistent statutes, a fact to which 
our section 4 of the Bill of Rights is a response (and which 
has counterparts in section 10 of the UK Human Rights Act).
2  Perhaps this is why the proponents of the bill do not suggest 
that there should be a power to make judicial declarations of 
incompatibility with those process principles. And the idea of 
reasonable limits on those process principles is incoherent: 
can it really be said to be reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society to not undertake a 
careful evaluation of the issue concerned?
3  It is significant that our Bill of Rights is essentially 
sacrosanct, even though it was passed in the very final 
stages of the 1987 Labour government with the votes only of 
the Labour Party.
4  Some of these are not too far from the Bill of Rights that 
was proposed for New Zealand by the Constitutional Society 
in 1958. Article 16 provided that no person should be 
denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to engage in any 
lawful trade, business profession or employment for which 
he may be properly qualified. Lest there be an argument 
that people could get only fair and reasonable returns, 
another provision said: ‘nothing in this article shall prevent 
the making of any provision for ensuring to any person an 
adequate reward for his special skill or ingenuity’. Then there 
was the right to ‘stability in the purchasing value of money in 
New Zealand’.
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